ENLARGEMENT, HOSPITALITY AND TRANSFORMATIVE POWERS

The Cases of Moldova and Ukraine

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1 Cf. Dinan, Desmond: Europe recast. a history of European union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2004, p. 267.

2 Leonard, Mark/Grant, Charles: Georgia and the EU. Can Europe's neighbourhood policy deliver? Centre for European Reform Policy Brief 2005, p. 1.

3 Wolczuk, Kataryna: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. Centre for European Reform Policy Paper 2005, p. 1.

4 Fisher, Sharon: Moldova. In: Global Insight. April 2005, p. 8.

5 Ibid.

6 Wolczuk 2005, p. 1.

7 http://www.europa.eu.int.

8 Dinan, Desmond: 2004, p. 279.

The European Union has undergone tremendous changes in recent years with the most comprehensive enlargement in its history. On May 1, 2004 ten new countries acceded to the EU (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus) and more countries are eager to join or have even been accepted as candidate countries for entry into the European Union. Recently, Romania and Bulgaria followed the ten newcomers as they finished their accession process and became members of the EU in January 2007. Currently, the EU consists of 27 countries, with a population of roughly 500 million and the largest economy in the world.

Regardless of the incongruence between the old member states of the EU, the enlargement seemed inevitable since the reunited Europe could not restrict itself to the western part of Europe.[1] Thus, the enlargement processes of the EU can indeed be viewed as an example of a reunification and integration process of Europe after the end of the Cold War. The countries that were previously linked to the USSR (e.g. Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary) or the Warsaw Pact, now enjoy independence and are on the path of democracy and market economy, which constitute the membership criteria adopted by the European Council in 1993. Even countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus which are not yet candidate countries for the EU have gone through substantial changes, such as Georgia after the Rose Revolution, which was symbolized by public buildings using the EU flag along side the Georgian flag.[2] Ukraine has also been going through significant changes after their Orange Revolution in the Winter of 2004, and this indicates some of the more immediate and constructive developments.[3] Meanwhile, not all countries have been through such a progressive development as the above-mentioned countries. The changes to Moldova's political orientation have not been of revolutionary dynamics. Nevertheless, the political perspectives have changed within the Communist party, which recently experienced their political victory.[4] Despite the experiences in Moldova, which contrast the revolutionary dynamics, the Moldovan leaders, like the newly democratised countries, also have articulated an aspiration for membership and a sense of belonging to Europe. The re-elected Moldovan President pledged in his inauguration speech that he would continue the rapprochement with the EU and further stated that he would »[...] pursue economic development and respect human rights and political freedoms«.[5]

Another indicative example of this sense of belonging to Europe is the statement made by the recently elected President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko at the Davos World Economic Forum 2005, who said, »I feel like I am a European. I live in a European country and possess European values«.[6]

Even though the enlargement of the EU is a historical achievement in contemporary Europe, it also poses fundamental questions about the size, character and purpose of the EU. Especially seen in the light of the Dutch and the French referendums (even though the referendums could reflect domestic politics and not the EU enlargement process), most recent events concerning the crises of the EU Constitutional Treaty and membership aspirations of countries like Georgia, Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine pose questions for their future relationship.

Why should countries like Moldova and Ukraine, which regard themselves as core European countries, be turned away just because the EU leaders cannot get their own house in order with the current Constitutional Treaty crisis? One has to recall the existing Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) that allows any European state to apply for membership if they fulfil the principles outlined in Article 6:1 of the TEU: »the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law«.[7] Even though the EU is often described as an exclusive entity, it is clear that inclusion and integration have been the fundamental driving forces of the EU. Despite the contemporary attitude among the citizens of the EU that currently appears rather unenthusiastic, one has to recall the previous enlargement process of the EU. During this process the accession produced an atmosphere that some recognize as »enlargement fatigue« in public opinion.[8]

9 http://europa.eu.int/ rapid/pressReleasesAction. do?reference=SPEECH/02 /257.

10 Batt, Judy: The EU's new borderlands. Centre for European Reform Working Paper. London: Centre For European Reform 2003 p. 41.

11 Fisher 2005, p. 3.

12 Neergaard, Helle: Udvaegelse af cases: Samfundslitteratur 2001, p. 25.

13 The GUUM cooperation consists of following countries: Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Cf. Fisher 2005, p. 7.

14 Ibid.

15 The current article disregards the long-running power struggle between pro-Western President Victor Yushchenko and pro-Russian Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich. Even though the struggle appears to be the raison for the newly announcement of the new election the core focus is on the Ukrainians' expressed belongings to the Western Europe during the Orange revolution.

16 Kratochvíl, Petr (ed.): The European Union and Its Neighbourhood. Policies Problems and Priorities. Prague: Institute of International Relations 2006, pp. 13-25.

17 Derrida, Jacques/Dufourmantelle, Anne: Of Hospitality. Transl. by Rachel Bowlby. Stanford: Stanford UP 2000.

Therefore, the constitutional rejection and current reluctance in the EU cannot imply that another round of enlargement is a viable option in the future.

Günter Verheugen, EU commissioner in charge of enlargement in the Prodi Commission (1999 – 2004), in speech given in 2002, already claimed that enlargement is a solution to important problems of today's Europe:

> We all know the benefits of enlargement: stability in Europe and extension of our markets. We also know the concerns of our citizens. But we have answers to these concerns. Enlargement is not a problem, it is part of the solution, because it gives further stability to our neighbours. It allows them to participate in our community policies, which provide the basis for security and welfare of our citizens. Enlargement is above all a concept of conflict prevention.[9]

The hypothesis of this article is that there will be an enhanced widening and deepening process because it is the fundamental idea and the reason for the success of the last fifty years of European integration. As a comprehensive political project and an ongoing institutional project, the EU needs to maintain the visionary dynamism; as a regional pole of aggregation it continues to exercise its appeal onto the countries that lies in its sphere of influence. So far it has been evident that the consequences of »ins« and »outs« are crucial since the economic gaps are likely to widen after the enlargement processes. Notwithstanding, the revolutionary dynamics of the Orange Revolution might have encouraged the Ukrainians in their reform process, as it has been more patchy compared with their Polish neighbours.[10] This is why Moldova needs the EU's visionary dynamism more than ever, since Romania's newly membership of the EU will widen the economical divergence between the two neighbouring countries. Further, looking at the geographic tensions between Moldova's other neighbour countries, and internally by the Transdnietstrian region, it seems obvious that the enlargement has not reached its limits.[11] Therefore, Moldova, Ukraine and the EU have a mutual interest in an ever-stronger cooperation, and the EU therefore has to consider a »membership perspective« and »enhanced agreement« for countries such as Moldova and Ukraine.

Theoretical framework

The main assumption is that the EU currently finds itself in a crisis, and Moldova and Ukraine have been selected to illustrate this assumption.[12] The objective of the article is normative, referring to what the EU ought to do. Furthermore, the goal is to illustrate some of the social and political mechanisms which are taking place, and will likely affect the relationships between the EU, Moldova and Ukraine in the future. The two Eastern European countries have significance because of their immediate belonging, and their intermediate position between Russia and Western European countries. The countries are part of GUUM,[13] and therefore have a future significance because they can generate positive synergies within the South Caucasus.[14] Furthermore, the elections that were recently held in Moldova and Ukraine[15] have, despite the diverse outcomes, shown a more ambitious approach towards the EU than under the previous governments. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the mechanisms identified solely relate to the context of Moldova and Ukraine. The clash of the discursive interpretations means that other countries in the European periphery depend on the course of the EU.[16]

The intention is to create a synthesis of the two main theoretical approaches by Mark Leonard's interpretation of »transformative power« and Derrida's formulation of »hospitality«. Regardless of the ontological disparities, the two theories have explanatory potential in the present context, while at the same time being deliberately capable of reworking elements in creative ways, and successfully incorporating pertinent suggestions derived from other paradigms.

The concept of »transformative power« and the EU model of Governance (Neighbourhood policy) and the French philosopher Jacques Derrida's concept of »hospitality« will be elaborated and discussed. Derrida perceives »hospitality« as being a significant part of political and ethical thinking, which initiates the initial reflections on what arrives at the new borders and the first contact with a »stranger«.[17] In relation to the EU's enlargement processes and the spread of values and the creation of stability eastwards in Europe, Moldova and Ukraine

18 Kratochvíl 2006, p. 30.

19 Friis, Lykke: Den europaeiske byggeplads – fra faelles moent til europaeisk forfatning. København: Nordisk Bogcenter 2001, p. 340.

20 Wolczuk, Kataryna: 2005, p. 4f.

21 Leonards, Mark: Why Europe will run the 21st century. London: Fourth Estate 2005, p. 51.

22 Ibid., p. 63-68.

23 Leonard, Mark: Europe's Transformative Power. London: Centre for European Reform Bulletin #40 (2005).

24 Cooper, Robert: The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Atlantic Books 2004, p. 164.

25 Youngs, Richard: Sharpening European Engagement. Centre for European Reform Foreign Policy Centre 2004.

will be used as examples of the numerous dilemmas facing modern Europe and the continuation of the EU integration process.

The political discourses have evolved into incongruent interpretations of »transformative power«. Despite the various interpretations, there are strong links between »transformative powers« and the previous experiences with enlargement with regard to Eastern Europe.[18] In order to become a member of the EU, the accession countries have to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria that pledge for democratic institutions, judicial protection, respect for ethics minorities and human rights, and a market economy.[19] In this context, it means that Moldova and Ukraine are dependent of the willingness of the EU, and the transformation of internal political and economic reforms that are necessary for an »EU-model«.[20] The EU has an exclusive position and thereby the ability to use soft power in order to transform and encourage post-totalitarian regimes. This means that they have a normative position to conduct political and economic reforms in countries like Moldova and Ukraine, in contrast to the more militaristic strategy often deployed by the US.[21]

The relationship between Moldova, Ukraine and the EU depends on the future course of the EU. The use of Derrida's theory of »hospitality« provides an explanatory framework for discussing whether the EU entertains the complexity of »hospitality« or absolute closure. Throughout, the constructivist approach to international relations of his concept is used to better understand the problems of the changing meanings within the EU. The relationship between the member states of the EU and Moldova and Ukraine depend on these changing meanings and is connected to the metaphors brought into play by the political establishment. This refers to the concept of »transformative power« as explained by Mark Leonard and the interrelated elements between the current crises of the EU, which can be viewed as being a matter of redefining collective meaning within the EU. Consequently, this redefinition might have an impact on the inclusion or exclusion of the formerly post-authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe. In order to comprehend the synthesis between the theoretical frameworks, the following distinction is made: »transformative power« concerns the process of European integration, whereas »hospitality« denotes the final objective.

Transformative Power and European Integration

Power is a social phenomenon that, throughout history, has been ascribed with conflicting definitions and interpretations. However, when power is discussed, it is important to understand the difference between power by force and power by conviction. The American scholar Joseph Nye has used the expressions »hard power« and »soft power« to denote this fundamental and central difference when power is discussed in international relations. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that these distinctions are most valid and used to describe foreign policy behavior of political giants of the contemporary world; the US and EU constituting two obvious examples.[22]

A government can put »hard power« into effect through military spending and unilateral foreign policies, whereas »soft power« can be viewed as a more delicate concept, implying a long-term change of cultural structures and institutional reforms often combined with multilateral foreign policies. In addition, in international relations, it is important that governments employing »hard power« realize that there are marked boundaries confining the amount of potential »hard power«. One British scholar has observed that, »the more the US administration resorts to employing hard power, the greater the damage to the country's soft power.«

This statement indicates that the scholar views »hard power« and »soft power« as communicating vessels, though he misses to discuss whether it is possible for a government to somehow align »hard power« with »soft power«. The vessel between »hard power« and »soft power« is often materialized as a dichotomy between the USA and the EU. Consequently, the USA and the EU need to work together in order to meet the challenges in a global world and comprehend the order and chaos in the twenty-first century. According to Robert Cooper this requires military hard power and last, but not least multilateral legitimacy, which is »soft power«.[24]

In analyzing international relations, it has been noticed that the Europeans have developed a completely new power paradigm, which sharply diverges from the American paradigm. The name of one soft power-variation has been termed »transformative power«.[25]

26 Leonard 2005, p. 53f.

27 Cf. http://www.delmda.cec.eu.int.

28 Wolczuk, Kataryna: Ukraine's European Choice. Centre for European Reform Foreign Policy Centre 2004, p. 1.

29 Grant, Charles: Europe's Blurred Boudaries. Rethinking enlargement and neighbourhood policy. London: Centre For European Reform 2006, p. 52.

30 Ibid., p. :62.

31 Kratochvíl 2006, p. 22.

The notion of »transformative power« seems more comprehensive in the long-term, and one could declare that it is about reshaping the world fairly, than winning short-term struggles. It cannot be measured in terms of military budgets or smart missile technology, but it is captured in treaties, constitutions and laws.[26] This entails that there exists a pronounced difference between America and Europe in terms of diametrically opposed power paradigms. In addition, it is important to emphasize that »transformative power« is not a static concept, but depicts an action-oriented process.

When studying former post-authoritarian regimes and transition countries, such as Spain and Ireland, into mainstream European countries, the idea of transformative power is a valid conceptual instrument. The concept clearly describes and explains why and how these countries, in a relatively short period of time, developed from backward peripheral societies into, in many respects, European success stories. Regardless of the two countries' historical divergence, both countries are today regarded as role models which newer members of the EU should strive to emulate. At the current moment, a Moldovan or Ukrainian membership of the EU cannot be regarded as something very hypothetical. However, it is already relevant to analyse the amplitudes between the positive approach of Moldova and Ukraine vis-à-vis European integration. Consequently, having the Spanish and Irish success stories in mind, the same notion could also apply within the framework of transformative power. Moldova and Ukraine openly stated that they want to be taken into consideration for a stronger cooperation with the EU. Further, the EU has made it explicit that political courage and farsightedness from Moldova's and Ukraine's political leaders encourages and consolidates the relationship with the EU.[27] Despite the incentives for a more constructive milieu in relation to the two countries, the EU still shows little enthusiasm despite the Ukraine's explicit request to the EU to provide the country a »membership perspective«.[28]

An EU »membership perspective« or an »enhanced agreement« would give a more clear signal that these countries are ready to allow Europe to enforce new policies and the promotion of institutional reforms. This would certainly have a key impact on political development in countries like Moldova and Ukraine in terms of democratic development, institutional stability, and market integration. There are several EU policies through which »transformative power« can be exercised. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) can be viewed as the most effective instrument:

> The ENP offers partner countries a new kind of relationship with the EU, going beyond co-operation to include closer political links and an element of economic integration. In addition to these incentives it offers a stake in the internal market, support in meeting EU standards as well as assistance with reforms that will stimulate economic and social development. In turn the ENP partners accept precise commitments, which can be monitored, to strengthen the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, including rights of persons to minorities, to promote market-oriented economic reforms, to promote employment and social cohesion and co-operate on key foreign policy objectives such as counter-terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[29]

Over the coming years, it is likely that a shift in the use of transformative power will be seen, since the current neighbourhood policy is an inadequate tool. At the current moment some —though not all— member states are hostile to develop the concept on the route towards new memberships. Nevertheless, the EU could and should provide new alternatives and participate in other important areas, such as the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) or enhance the various trade and aid instruments.[30] Overall however, these policies should have the intrinsic incentive to conduct and convince governments of countries such as Moldova and Ukraine to review their previous policies on several areas like economy, security, and external relations. However, the political discourse among the (old) frustrated member states indicate that the NHP could backlash if the EU continues to postpone the possibility for accession dates or inform whether further enlargement is entirely removed from the table.[31] If Moldova and Ukraine continue to act accordingly the requirements proposed by the EU these countries definitely deserve a clear response otherwise this will mitigate internal frustrations among their populations. Additionally, one should mention that the EU in the past has financed programmes for integrative facilitation in a pre-accession stage. One can point to the PHARE programme (originally set up to support the transition of Poland and Hungary to democracy and to market economies in July 1989) that quickly

32 Drulák, Petr (ed.): National and European Identities in EU Enlargement. Views from Central and Eastern Europe. Prague: Institute of International Relations 2001, p. 21.

33 Ibid., p. 181.

34 Huntington, Sammuel P.: The Clash of Civilizations. In Foreign Affairs Summer 1993, p. 35-36.

35 Ruzicka, Jan: Constructing Region(s) in International Relations: What is Central Europe? In: Brandeis Graduate Journal, Vol. 1 (2003), p. 4f.

36 Tremin, Dmitri: Russia, the EU and the common neighbourhood. London: Centre For European Reform 2005, p. 2.

37 Drulák 2001, p. 12.

38 Bailey, Ellen: Our World, Moldova 2006. In: http://weblinks1.epnet.com/citation.asp?tb=1&_ua=bo+B%5F+shn+1+db+f5hjnh+bt.

39 Samson, Ramona (ed.): Copenhagen Working Papers in LSP. Copenhagen: Department of FIRST Section of European Studies: Copenhagen Business School Frederiksberg Bogtrykkeri.

40 Huntington 1993, p. 26.

41 http://www.workmall.com.

42 Samson 2003, p. 23.

emerged to assist countries in Central and Eastern Europe on their road to EU membership, and TACIS which assists former countries of the CIS (e.g. Moldova and Ukraine), in their transition to market economies and democratic development; in both cases the EU has employed soft power mechanisms.

The EU: Towards Hospitality?

A reflection on the identity of Europe necessarily entails a parallel reflection on Europe and its others. In fact, identity and »otherness« are just the two poles around which the intellectual effort aimed at the conceptual definition of Europe is articulated.[32] In this sense, then, the identification of Europe always presupposes a relation of reciprocal constitutiveness and a dynamic engagement with what is clearly perceived as non-European. In political discourses, the demarcation between the concepts of »European identity« and »national identity« is often transparent. Despite the transparency, these concepts are used without further explanation; however, the perception of »identity« is often attached to larger communities. Given a sense of belonging to a collective identity, one might claim, that the construction of a multitude of collective identities has to be accomplished.[33] The formulation of »Europeanness« happens at the edge, at the porous border, which brings Europeans together and consequently separates Europeans at the same time.

The borders between different geo-cultural and geo-political spheres poses the most problematic case for the concept of Europe–both for the nature and delimitations of its content, and for its tenability as an interpretive category altogether. Samuel P. Huntington argues that countries can be regarded as torn countries for the reason of their societal belongings to one civilization in addition to other civilizations. The most obvious example is Turkey that stopped defining itself in opposition to the West and started to define itself as a modern secular state by applying for membership of NATO and the EU. Still, at the same time, the culture and the traditions of the country are non-European.[34] One of the central themes under study in the present article relates to the questions: where do countries that aspire for EU membership belong and what should governments from Eastern European countries then say? What should they strive for, and should these countries origins and civilizations be considered as Eastern European countries, or parts of the former Austro-Hungarian or the Roman Empire, from the Borderlands of the Western Civilization or, most importantly, outright West? In 1983 the Czech writer Milan Kundera wrote an article that subsequently appeared as the *Tragedy of Central Europe*.[35] Although, Kundera refers to a loosely equated Central Europe, he argues, that political borders are inauthentic, claiming rather that Central Europe always has been culturally and historically a part of the Western Civilization. The various forms of historical realities materialize without any substances, which the political discourse exhibited during previous enlargement and the Central European countries integration into NATO and the EU under the theme called »return to Europe«.

Among these borderlands, it is particularly interesting to analyze the cases of Moldova and Ukraine.[36] Defying the taxonomic zeal of even the most stubborn Huntingtonian observer, Moldova and Ukraine are clearly situated on the overlapping margins of two distinct, yet related worlds.[37] Europe, on the one hand, and the Russo-centric Slavic orbit on the other. Moldova has since ancient times been known as the gateway between Europe and Asia.[38] The Ukrainian example is a remarkable case since the origin of the country always had a double meaning, and hence the name can be interpreted as »borderland«. The western part of Ukraine once belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, one should explicitly mention that the Huntingtonian line between the Western Civilization and the Eastern Civilization cuts through Ukraine.[40] Like the ambiguity of Ukraine, Moldova's Latin origins can be traced back to the Roman occupation, when parts of Moldova's culture were formed by the Roman colonists and the local population.[41] These underlying tensions have often emerged to surface during the course of the history of Moldova and Ukraine, in ways reminiscent of the Zapadniki v. Panslavist split that is so helpful a category in analyzing the tensions between Europe, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia's attitudes towards Europe. [42]

In a schematic yet useful way, it could be said that two different attitudes have historically dominated the debate over the nature of the EU's relations with its others. The concepts of »inclusiveness« and »exclusiveness« are often deployed to characterize the alternative

between a more open institutional design of the Union, one that sets the standard for the admission of new members relatively low, and one that clearly states the right of the Union to refuse the accession of new members.

In many ways, the interplay of these contrasting arguments is paralleled by the discussion on hospitality that has been proposed by Derrida. With explicit references to the Greek precedent, and with a fully contemporary perceptiveness, Derrida has theorized of hospitality as a project of ethical responsibility. This is how he frames the issue:

> That is where the question of hospitality begins: must we ask the foreigner to understand us, to speak our language, in all the senses of this term, in all its possible extensions, before being able and so as to be able to welcome him into our country?[43]

As such, the concept of hospitality is characterized by an insoluble and paradoxical contradiction in its meaning. In Derrida's own words,

> We will always be threatened by this dilemma between, on the one hand, unconditional hospitality that dispenses with law, duty, or even politics, and, on the other, hospitality circumscribed by law and duty.[44]

Absolute, unconditional hospitality, which he calls »hyperbolical«, the readiness to welcome any number of unknown others, is not strictly speaking a possibility. Yet, hospitality always entertains a relationship of tension with the opposite pole of absolute closure. In accordance to Derrida, we have to use the language and continuously negotiate between these two extensions of hospitality.

On the one hand, the prerequisite for hospitality is being master of one's own house, country, or nation. In order to be hospitable, one needs to have the power to host, one needs to be in control. This controlling attitude is deployed both at the level of one's own self-identity, and as a form of control over those who are being hosted. With an analogous rhetoric, some commentators today argue that the project of the EU needs to be carefully defined and consolidated within the perimeter of the current member states before even considering the possibility of accepting new members.

In contrast, a suspension of the judgement and control in regard to who is eligible to become a guest, is itself a constitutive element of genuine, disinterested hospitality. However, this loss of control calls into question the »master–visitor« relation that is a necessary condition of hospitality, making the whole concept riddled with tensions and contradictions. These contradictions, in turn, according to Derrida, do not weaken hospitality, or make it impossible, but, on the contrary, are the very precondition of its possibility. An element of regulation and an element of dispassionate openness are, however, the fundamental components of hospitality:

> It is as if the stranger or foreigner held the keys. This is always the situation of the foreigner, in politics too, that of coming as a legislator to lay down the law and liberate the people or the nation by coming from the outside, by entering into the nation or the house, into the home that lets him enter after having appealed to him.[45]

In a sense, then, it can be said that »transformative power« can pave the way for hospitality. Making the EU and Moldova and Ukraine, respectively, more appealing to each other, it can remove latent tensions and lay the basis of new productive dialogues. The denotation of Derrida's hospitality, then, is not only a philosophically intriguing position, but also a feasible political project, and arguably an exigent one in the context of contemporary Europe. Today more than ever, Europe needs to engage itself critically on its own attitudes toward Otherness. In particular, looking eastward towards its »borderland«, Europe's re-identification and acknowledgement of an ethical duty of responsibility towards the other seems crucial. Consequently, the European enigma and the relationship and attitudes to the Otherness should designate the time and space which correspond to the promises and the law of universal hospitality.[46] Derrida argues that the ethical duty also articulates new openings to what is Europe, and more importantly, what is not Europe:

> The same duty also dictates welcoming foreigners in order not only to integrate them but to recognize and accept their alterity: two concepts of hospitality that

47 Derrida, Jacques: The Other Heading: Reflections On Today's Europe. Bloomington: Indiana UP 1992.

48 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/md.html.

49 Ibid.

50 Fisher 2005, p. 8.

51 http://www.azi.md/nevs?ID=37932.

52 http://www.azi.md.

53 Fisher 2005, p. 9.

54 Ibid.

today divide our European and national consciousness. [...] The same duty dictates respecting differences, idioms, minorities, singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement and univocity, the law of the majority, opposition to racism, nationalism, and xenophobia.

This same duty surely calls for responsibility, for the responsibility to think, speak, and act in compliance with this double contradictory imperative—a contradiction that must »be effective, and with experience, through experiment, interminable«.[47]

It is in light of this dynamic concept of hospitality, in turn made possible by the continuous workings of »transformative power«, that the current perspectives of the enlargement of the EU will be considered, with an emphasis on Moldova and Ukraine as possible beneficiaries of an enlargement. Meanwhile, what is yet to come, is the appearance of a paradoxical contradiction which hospitality always entertains. Following the present crisis in the EU mentioned in the introduction, this article elaborates on Moldova and Ukraine. The two countries represent several valid dichotomies facing the self-imposed hegemony from the EU and member states' discussions of future enlargement: an »inclusive« or »exclusive« Union, »hospitality« or »double standards«.

Moldova Today

Before talking about a potential entry of Moldova into the European Union, it is needed to observe some basic facts about the country. Moldova was formerly a part of Romania, but was incorporated into the former the Soviet Union close to the Second World War. Despite the country's independency on the 27th of August 1991, Moldova has remained under markedly Russian influence.[48] Currently, Moldova's population consists of approximately 4.4 million inhabitants, representing the following ethnic groups: Moldovan/Romanian 78.2%, Ukrainians 8.4%, Russians 5.8%, Gagauz 4.4%, and Bulgarians 1.9%, others 1.3%. Notable is the ethnic group of Slavs in the region of Transnistria that causes several internal disputes.[49]

Recently, Moldova's political situation took a spectacular shift compared with previous decades. Whereas countries like Georgia and Ukraine had more successful revolutions with people in the streets and public discourses expressing political statements, Moldova experienced its »revolution« within the ruling Communist party.[50] The Communist party has been in charge of ruling the country since 2001, and it regained political power after the party once again emerged victorious during the elections held in March 2006.[51] The tensions between Russia and the western community restrained the democratic movement in Moldova since the Communists backed stronger cooperation with Russia. Apparently, this political strategy had an ambiguous outcome because some of the Moldovans were convinced this would facilitate stronger incentives for a satisfactory solution regarding Transdniestria.

Moldova: On the Track towards the EU?

The political development in the Republic of Moldova seems worsened after 2001. According to the Reuters agency, the officials from the EU proclaimed that the Republic of Moldova had significant irregularities during Voronin's presidency.[52] Nevertheless, during the last decade with different presidents and the re-election of Voronin, Moldova has obviously announced a plan for building up stronger relationships with the EU.[53] Even though the re-elected president has sought a pro-European platform, it still remains doubtful whether the ruling Communists will modify their foreign policy towards a more »Europeanised« policy. The Communists have not completed any substantial changes in regards to misconduct that influence the country's economy, corruption, strong censorship on the media, etc.[54]

It still remains uncertain whether the structural reforms can be implemented. However, the EU is familiarized with the »Europeanised« intentions, which were declared during the end of the campaign, and hopes that these declarations will be carried out. President Voronin has reached out for a stronger cooperation with the EU, but the increased collaboration has not been officially announced, and it is uncertain whether the country will strive for a »membership perspective«. However, this political trend is equivalent with the EU's, since Moldova currently is not being offered any EU membership prospects, but only a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. This agreement was established already in 1998,

55 http://www.europa.eu.int.

56 Ibid.

57 http://www.azi.md.

58 http://www.delmda.cec.eu.int/ en/whatsnew/2005/03/parlement_ election.htm.

59 Grant 2006, p. 57.

60 http://www.um.dk.

61 Grant 2006, p. 49.

when the first approval of cooperation was effectuated.[55] Although with the joint adoption of the EU-Moldova Action plan on the 22nd of February 2005, it shows that further cooperation and reinforcement of the bilateral relationship is being supported.[56]

The rapprochement between the EU and Moldova likely depends on the country's ability to transform the national institutions in the country and move towards the EU. Moreover, the pro-European forces in Moldova depend on the Europeans' reactions from the EU. Marianne Mikko, the Head of the European Parliament Delegation, launched after the election:

> Although there have been a lot of problems during the election campaign, the people of Moldova have shown that they want to be a part of a democratic Europe. It is a clear WISH of the European Parliament to build on this desire and assist Moldovans in the future development of their democracy.[57]

Commissioner for External Relations and ENP, Benita Ferrero-Waldner's response appears to be equivalent and in accordance with Marianne Mikko's statement though the Commission's attitude could show a more reluctant approach:

> The European Commission recalls that the democratic conduct of 6 March Parliamentary elections was a key commitment undertaken by Moldova with the endorsement of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan. The European Commission therefore calls on the Government of Moldova to ensure that the shortcomings identified by the international election monitoring observation mission regarding campaign and media conditions are satisfactorily addressed.[58]

The comment shows the ambiguity of the EU, and the problems in the case of Moldova. The election had several shortcomings, which need to be addressed satisfactorily in accordance to the ENP. At the same time, the quotation faces a significant issue and somehow confirms the present dilemma that the EU finds itself in. Mikko welcomes the people of Moldova and their »Europeanisation«, whereas the Commission has a more reluctant attitude towards »hospitality« and thereby towards the transformative forces in Moldova. Nevertheless, the commitments taken by European Parliament Delegation do not correspond to the commitments of the Commission. On the contrary, the Commission's reluctance reciprocally gives the Commission the opportunity to exclude rather than include Moldova. The Commission and the member states should not be held responsible for all of the problems. Several of the neighbour countries have been slow in fulfilling their promises. Moldova has, for example, had a poor in implementing the economic reforms announced in the inauguration speech of the re-elected president. The implementation of the institutional reforms has not been undertaken. This has, however, been admitted to by the Moldovan government. The lack of implementation illustrates the temporal incongruence and vagueness between what is required from the neighbours of the EU, and the incentive to conduct and convince the national governments to review the previous policies.[59]

The Copenhagen Criteria constitutes the most important efforts towards the delineation and rationalization of clear guidelines to be followed by countries aspiring to become members of the EU.[60] However, in the mutated context determined by the recent constitutional crisis and the current absorption capacity, a less friendly approach towards new candidate members is likely to be seen. In particular, the two newest members in the EU, Bulgaria and Romania, whose process of integration were already in an advanced phase, are likely to benefit from the pre-crisis, and comparatively more open, attitude of the EU. On the other hand, Turkey, whose position was already within a more coherent framework, suffers a further delay because of this institutional stalemate. Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe, and therefore far from fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria at the current moment.[61] There are still several integrative factors which Moldova needs to address before the country can meet the Copenhagen Criteria. As the country does not fulfil the criteria, the likelihood of a membership perspective is unlikely, whereas an enhanced agreement could consolidate the implementation of institutional reforms. However, if the government manages to implement the institutional reforms as promised, the outcome of this situation would be a sort of double standard for accession; a state of affairs in which countries like Moldova, which aspire for rapprochement with the EU and for a membership perspective, and in case of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria candidacy then membership is still projected into an undefined future.

62 http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/up.html.

63 Wolczuk, Kataryna: EUI Working
Papers RSCAS NO. 15 (2004), p. 1f.

64 Wolczuk 2005, p. 3.

65 Grant 2006, p. 54.

66 Valasek, Thomas: Ukraine's
Real Problem April/May. Centre of
European Reform Bulletin Issue 53
(2007), p. 2.

67 Wolczuk 2005, p. 1.

Ukraine Today

Ukraine was a part of the former USSR before the Second World War, and continued to be a part of the USSR until the end of the communist era in the early 1990's. Ukraine has changed politically and economically many times during its history, primarily through wars, revolutions and as a result of successive governments and political leaders. Currently, Ukraine has a population of 49.6 million representing different cultural backgrounds. The population consists of 77.8% Ukrainians, 17.3% Russians, and 0.6% Belarusians, 0.5% Moldovans, 0.5% Crimean Tatars, 0.4% Bulgarians, 0.3% Romanians, 0.3% Polish, 0.2% Jewish and 1.8% other.[62]

Ukraine's political situation changed radically due to the presidential election at the end of 2004. The choice was between the Kuchma regime's candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and the opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. At the end of the election campaign the country was divided into two groups of nearly identical sizes–one which supported Yanukovych and one which supported Yushchenko.

The second round was marred by electoral fraud and resulted in the mass protests of the so-called Orange Revolution, which led to a repeat voting for the second round. Viktor Yushchenko emerged as the undisputed winner of the presidency. Additionally, widespread international criticism was leveraged at the outgoing President Leonid Kuchma.

Ukraine: On Track towards the EU?

For a decade, Ukraine has, under different presidents and for different reasons, officially manifested the intention to become a member of the EU. This was also the case of the Kuchma regime, during which the Ukrainians strived for EU integration, but without showing any signs of a »Europeanisation« process for transforming the country. However, the newly elected president Viktor Yushchenko is a reformist and has a pro-European policy platform and has officially announced that he wants Ukraine to be granted a membership perspective.[63] Yushchenko appears more conscious of all the »homework« that has to be done before a Ukrainian application can be taken seriously by the EU member states. Yushchenko has to open the economy, combat political corruption that arose during the Kuchma regime, and re-unify the country after the post-electoral fractures. The pro-Europeans will have to implement difficult and painful reforms in the public sector to show the Ukrainian population and the rest of EU fast and tangible improvements for the country.[64] Yushchenko also has to prove and convince the Eurosceptics in Ukraine that the country's entry into the EU is beneficial and that the imperative is the final completion. Ukraine emerges at the forefront of the Eastern neighbours that reached out for deeper cooperation and may accomplish institutional reforms. Ukraine has fulfilled several action plans established with the EU and co-operates with the EU programmes for border assistance in Transdniestria.[65] This has been done to a larger extent compared to Moldova, which needs to reintegrate the region. Currently, the institutional reforms have not yet reached cognitive convergence between the various actors within the public sector and the EU. Civil society still does not see any reason for further integration with the EU or NATO. The bureaucracy still looks as if it remains inward-looking, which complicates the transformation of the administrative culture and the consolidation of the institutional links between the EU and NATO.[66]

And what are the Europeans' reactions to Yushchenko's victory and aspirations for a Ukrainian EU membership? No doubt the victory for Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution was a delight for the democratic forces around Europe, and it brings hope for further democratic developments inside Ukraine. But the reaction from top politicians in the EU was somewhat different and more equivocal:

> While the European Parliament has called on EU leaders to give Ukraine a »membership perspective«, EU foreign ministers only went so far as to acknowledge that the Orange Revolution »is credible proof that Ukraine's European aspirations are based on common values shared by both European states and citizens«. The European Commission insists that the EU and Ukraine should first make headway under the EU's new »European neighbourhood policy« […].[67]

68 Ibid.

69 Grant 2006, p. 54.

70 Leonards 2005, p. 19.

71 Sharon 2005, p. 8.

72 Guérot, Ulrike: The European Paradox: Widening and deepening in the European Union. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution USA 2004, p. 2.

The above quotation supports the main assumption that the EU currently finds itself in a crisis concerning further enlargement and for those who view the constitution as »their home«. This is the core dilemma in this article—is the EU showing »hospitality«, or increased »double standards« for EU candidates? The quote from the European Commission does not signal the Ukrainians that they are welcome in Europe, and perhaps it increases their sense of exclusion and their suspicion of EU's double standards.[68] Although a great deal of »EU-money« has been allocated to Ukraine in order to enhance the incentives for greater democracy and improvements in access to justice and human rights, the Ukrainians dislike the ENP.[69] Despite successes such as the recognition of Ukraine's market economy and the plausibility that the EU will negotiate an »enhanced agreement«, the EU still remains silent regarding rapprochement towards a membership perspective.

The progress of Ukraine's commitments to the Copenhagen Criteria and its rapprochement gives the impression that Ukraine has a more ambitious approach towards the EU than vice-versa. This clearly indicates the present dichotomy between the pre-accession conditions and the common values since the pro-European administration represented by Yushchenko officially asked for membership perspective. The fulfilment and the rapprochement are mainly being completed by Ukraine and this could somehow generate »double standards« that are more considerable than in the case of Moldova. Ukraine has explicitly asked for a membership perspective, whereas Moldova is vaguer in appealing to the EU call. This somehow contrasts with the Moldovan rapprochement as the Moldovans have yet to launch a more official platform towards an EU membership perspective.

Discussion

The perspectives of Moldovan and Ukrainian integration into the EU are remote at this point, but far from unthinkable and certainly on the agenda of the most perspicacious Europeanists. It imposes a careful reflection not only on the identity of Europe, but also on the nature of its relations with the others. Jean Monnet, the grounding farther of the European project, predicted from the very beginning the most notable principle of the EU:

> We are starting a process of continuous reform which can shape tomorrow's world more lastingly than the principles of revolution so widespread outside the west.[70]

In the contemporary context this has been permeated by the momentous experiences of the Orange Revolution and the transformation of Communists in Moldova.[71] Notwithstanding the holding of (partly) free elections, as has been the case of Ukraine and Moldova, the theme of further enlargement seems unlikely at the current moment. The failure of the European Constitutional Treaty at the French and Dutch referenda have generated a certain hostility, contrasting with those elements of »Manifest Destiny-like« ideology that have characterized the EU and discourse of expansion in the last decade. But exactly for this reason a new thoughtfulness about the prospects of the EU project is in order. Given that there are several disparities among the surrounding countries, the EU can take different approaches. However, the EU has to resolve the inconsequential rhetoric and fulfil its commitments. For years, the EU has tried to widen and deepen at the same time. Widen by expansion of the number of member states which have been more or less a success, and deepen by several new treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice). The latest constitution was an attempt to tighten up rules and regulations, which has been a political failure according to the latest »No« referendums in France and the Netherlands.

The EU has to recognize the trade-off between deeper integration and the realization of its geo-strategic potential. EU policies essentially consist of agricultural support programmes, regional development funds, and the implementation of a comprehensive competition policy. If the EU is to continue its development as a political power, it is necessary that the EU change from re-distributive policies toward spending on geo-strategic policy goals. New member states are unambiguous assets for the EU in terms of internal market and environment issues. But new members from Eastern Europe could prove a heavy load on the EU agricultural budget. This implies that in preparation for future enlargement, including countries like Moldova and Ukraine, the EU will have to further develop domestic policies.[72] Currently, the political discourse appears to handle the trade-off between deeper integration and further enlargement by reintroducing the concept of »variable geometry«.

73 Grant 2006, p. 30.

74 Dyker, David. A.: The Dynamic Impact on the Central-Eastern European Economies of Accession to the European Union: Social Capability and Technology Absorption. In: Europe-Asia Studies 53 (2001) 7, pp. 1001-1021.

This originally allowed countries like Britain or Denmark to follow dissimilar paths in comparison with the rest of their EU partners.[73] Meanwhile, the concept seems to have several dichotomies such as financing, the risk that EU institutions could be weakened, the danger of exclusion, etc.

Similarly, an ongoing debate must be kept alive on the oscillation between »inclusive« and »exclusive« tendencies on the issue of EU enlargement. In particular, with reference to the cases of Moldova and Ukraine, and in light of the previous experiences of the latest enlargement of the other Central/Eastern European states granted EU membership in 2004, there seem to be important elements for which the rigid opposition of »inclusiveness« and »exclusiveness« is unable to account. Much like hospitality, which operates by first acknowledging and then blurring the boundaries between »master« and »slave«, »host« and »guest«, so the perspective of joining the EU can act as a powerful device to induce transformations at the political, social, and economic level.[74] By means of »transformative power« the EU, through its institutional network of treaties and agreements, its power of attraction, both political and economic, and perhaps even the idea of Europe itself, can indirectly provide countries like Moldova and Ukraine with the incentives for reform that in turn can make them viable candidates for entering the EU. As such »transformative power« acts slowly and is often invisible; but it can be argued that its effects will historically prove to be in the best strategic interest of EU, and of Moldova and Ukraine.

Conclusion

The political developments in Moldova and Ukraine have engendered a more positive approach to the EU. In the Moldovan case there is still several ambiguities since President Voronin regained power and the ruling Communists face several complications in the transformation towards the Copenhagen Criteria and the EU. Nevertheless, Voronin has announced that he is striving for a strong pro-European approach. President Yushchenko has signaled a more positive approach towards the EU, which has become urgent for the current member states of the EU. They have to engage strategically with their neighbors in Eastern Europe, and in particular to develop a comprehensive strategy towards Ukraine, its largest neighbour. The strategy of Yushchenko includes the categorization of Ukraine as a core European country stressing common values, identity and history and by this he is trying to blur the borders between the geo-cultural and the geo-political spheres.

In the discussion about enlargement in relation to Moldova and Ukraine, the elaboration of the concepts of »transformative power« and »hospitality« have proven to be valid theoretical frameworks which can explain current developments within Europe. The analysis identifies that the neighbourhood policy can be a significant instrument of »transformative power«. However, differentiations need to be addressed. Together with the Copenhagen criteria, this policy has so far been the only »clear« guideline given for countries aspiring to become members of the EU. The aim of the neighbourhood policy is not to win short-term benefits. Instead the neighbourhood policy focuses on the long-term perspective of stability by offering countries such as Moldova and Ukraine incentives to follow the path of »Europeanization«. Meanwhile the relationship between the EU and the two countries still materializes on the boundaries between »master« and »slave«, »host« and »guest«. Through the concept of hospitality, it has been highlighted throughout that some of the inherent contradictions lie in the concept of the European identity. As already stressed, a precondition for hospitality is the mastery of one's own house and the power to be in control. The analysis identifies that the constitutional crisis generates the risk of »double standards« as hidden mechanisms in order to preserve the exclusiveness of the EU. In order to be master in the house of the EU, different actors such as member states and institutions have to develop a strategy coping with the trade-off between deeper integration among current EU members and widening to include new member states. To most of the outside world Europe means the EU. The EU has never attempted to define »Europe«, and one could ask whether it is in the hands of few to define and construct European geo-cultural and geo-political spheres. Finally, it can be concluded that the theme of enlargement (maybe in the light of »variable geometry«) will continue for the years to come. Enlargement is an indispensable element for the success of the politico-institutional project of the EU.

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